#### IC: Actions Stockholm PhD Minicourse 2023

Ivo Welch

May 2023



#### Do ICs occur with infinitely many relevant actions?

### **Action Discreteness**

- ▶ As  $C \rightarrow \infty$ , ICs disappear
- Intuitively action discreteness is at the heart of ICs
  - Obvious and easy with two action choices
- Infinitely fine action choices destroy responsiveness (Ali), "invertibility"
  - In the extreme: continuous relevant choices

## **Key Question**

- Quantitative, not qualitative
- Can ICs then still matter economically? Or are they "just" a two-action curiosity?

### **Economic Meaning of Action Discreteness**

- No one buys 3.1415 apples
- Even if you buy 245g of Herring and your predecessor bought 240g of Herring, this difference probably would not even register.
- In real life, basic joining or not joining is often easiest to observe and remember.
  - If ICs just matter for two actions, we better be *very* cautious about interpreting economic meaning
- How much do ICs matter quantatively?

# How To Model?

- Want model with more vs. less choice granularity
  - ideally also in the very long-run.
  - ergo, not ideal with just two underlying value states
  - in this case, only two extremes are asymptotically optimal.
    - by asymptotic, I mean infinitely many signals.
- Want relevant action choices for granularity
  - not choices of 0.001, 0.002, 0.50, 0.998, 0.999 ?

### Used Baseline: Welch 1992 model

- Uniform distribution of possible values
  - "Diffuse Bayesian prior"
  - Asymptotically, not just V=0 vs. V=1, but continuous V
- ► Binary signals, *H*, *L*, with probability p=V.
  - makes tracking decisions a lot easier!
- Easy non-abstract inference rule with signals:

$$EV(h,S) = (h+1)/(S+2)$$

Nothing IC for a while. Observe previous signals.

#### **Relevant Available Choices**

- ▶ 2: 1/3, 2/3
- ▶ 3: 1/4, 2/4, 3/4
- S: (i+1)/(S+1) for  $i \in [0, ..., S-1]$
- matches possible inferences nicely.
- more *relevant* actions = least cascade-friendly.

### Agent Goal

Pick choice c closest to true value p.

### Agent Goal

Pick choice c closest to true value p.

Question: Does it matter whether objective is

• 
$$MAE = |c({s}) - p|$$
, or  
•  $MSE = (c({s}) - p)^2$ ?

### Agent Goal

Pick choice c closest to true value p.

Question: Does it matter whether objective is

• 
$$MAE = |c({s}) - p|$$
, or  
•  $MSE = (c({s}) - p)^2$ ?

early? eventually (asymptotically)?

## (Non-Linear) Algebra Sucks. Optimal C v:

$$\overline{\underline{v}}^{\star}(EV,C) \equiv \begin{cases} 1/(C+1) & \text{if } EV < 1.5/(C+1) \\ 2/(C+1) & \text{if } 1.5/(C+1) < EV < 2.5/(C+1) \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ C/(C+1) & \text{if } (C-0.5 \cdot C)/(C+1) < EV \end{cases}$$

$$= \frac{1}{C+1} + \left(\frac{1}{C-1}\right) \cdot \left\{\sum_{i=1}^{C-1} H\left(EV - \frac{2 \cdot i + 1}{2 \cdot C + 2}\right)\right\}$$

where  $f_i$  is binomial pdf and EV = f(...).

# **Tie-Breaking Rule**

# **Tie-Breaking Rule**

- **FP**: Follow Predecessor
- ► FO: Follow Own
- deterministic vs random.
  - deterministic makes tracking problem a lot easier.
  - with binary signals, agent will be either in an IC or her action will be *fully* invertible under MAE!
- > PS: in vstar function, I left tie-breaks open.

Rest is "Easy"

Given S observed signals of which h are H (no aspect of ICs yet), and C choices embedded in  $\overline{\nu}^*$ 

$$\mathsf{MAE}_{T}(C,S) \equiv \int_{p=0}^{1} p \cdot \left( \sum_{h=0}^{S} f_{i}(S,i,p) \cdot \left| \underline{\underline{v}}^{\star}(EV(h,S),C) - p \right| \right) dp .$$

Again, formula is not for IC, but for observation of *h* H's in *S* signals.

# Sequential Observable

Now we distinguish between

- SigObs
- ActObs (ICs possible)

which means that we can begin to consider ICs.

Q: Which TBR is most IC-friendly? unfriendly?



Note: Agent #5 will be responsive iff the 4th agent's inferred value is not 0.50. The choices are spaced narrowly enough that the first agent will have a perfect choice given her signal inference. This is not (necessarily) true for subsequent agents.



The choices are spaced narrowly enough that the second agent will have a perfect choice given her signal inference.



The choices are spaced narrowly enough that the third agent will have a perfect choice given her signal inference.

# Maximum (Boring IC) Theorem

- Under FP, IC is guaranteed to start by  $2 \cdot C$  agents.
- ▶ 4 Choices {1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5}.
- ► HHHLHHH
  - 1. 2/3 (action 0.6, not 0.4);
  - **2**. 3/4 (0.8, not 0.6);
  - 3. 4/5 (0.8, not 0.6);
  - 4. 4/6 (0.6, not 0.8);
  - 5. 5/7 (0.8, not 0.6);
  - 6. 6/8 (0.8, not 0.6);
  - 7. 7/9 (0.8, not 0.6)
- Agent #8: L: 7/10. H: 8/10. either way, 0.8. IC.

#### Theoremizor (not Thagomizer)

- compared to action distance now of 1/5
- due to inference distances of 1/10 between L/H

#### No Max Theorem For FO

- Under FO, the infinitely repeating HL|LH sequences always return to inference 0.5.
  - cannot guarantee IC onset *ever* (also at 0.375, etc.)
  - nevertheless, ICs happen fast, but not guaranteed within N

# Minimum (Boring IC) Theorem

- Cascade typically do not occur within C agents with best-spaced C (relevant) action choices
  - action  $\approx$  signal
  - excellent analogy to think of more choices as signals
  - thus, importance of actions declines with square-root

# IC / MAE As Function of *C* and *N*

- No easy algebra on non-linear discont. functions.
- Do you care?
  - economic models are for basic insights.
  - IC model is sketch, not realistic. when not (designed to be) realistic, and the goal is exploring basic quantitative aspect, do we really need closed-forms and proofs?
    - Philosophy: is showing basic effect the point?
    - Philosophy: is proving absence of opposite statics important?
  - aesthetic problem, not economic problem
    - yeah, bugs me a little, too!

#### Two Choices (FO) [Expected Mistake]



### Three Choices (FO)



# Five Choices (FO)



### Eleven Choices (FO, Thabit)



### Conclusion

- ► ICs are less important, but not unimportant
- Two actions give highest IC relevance.
- A small action space is meaningful but ICs are not critically sensitive.

### Conclusion

- ► ICs are less important, but not unimportant
- Two actions give highest IC relevance.
- A small action space is meaningful but ICs are not critically sensitive.

Anything Wrong?

### What Benchmark?

- ICs are about information blocking.
  - IC effect: more choices induce later onset due to better invertibility / more responsiveness
- But more choices also make choices closer to truth available.
  - even if all agents had perfect information
  - has really nothing to do with IC invertibility and onset delay effect

#### "Fair" Benchmark

What is the IC-specific dampener / reduction?

- IC invertibility and onset delay effect
- Should we benchmark ActObs against SigObs?!
  - SigObs gains better proximity to truth asymptotically
  - ActObs gains both some more proximity to truth and later onset (more invertibility)
  - In relative terms, more action choices could even benefit SigObs more than ActObs

# Two Choices (FO)



## Three Choices (FO)



# Five Choices (FO)



# Eleven Choices (FO)



# 47 Choices (FO)



# 95 Choices (FO)



### **Relative and Absolute Errors**



Number of Choices



## Perspective: What Was Interesting?

▶ What did *I* learn from model?

# Perspective: What Was Interesting?

What did I learn from model?

- More actions matter in the same sense that more information matters:
  - with many signals already, getting more signals becomes ever less important.
  - with many action choices already, getting more action choices becomes ever less important.

- We knew: infinite choices means perfect invertibility
- The importance of ICs is reasonably robust to the number of available actions:
  - In absolute terms (to true best choice), choice availability improvements mix in with invertibility improvements.
  - In relative terms to SigObs, ActObs onset (invertibility) is not even declining after two choices.

# Modeling Advice for PhD Students

- Model end result often looks goal-oriented directed, effortless, trivial(?), beautiful(?)
- Often ain't the case.
  - I did not understand needed model ingredients
    - e.g., better uniform than discrete (= 2 weeks). Thabits? stupid?
  - I did not know or understand what paper concluded
    - obvious once explained, not before that's a good thing!
    - I sometimes ask audiences *before* I tell them the answers to make it clear that it ain't so obvious and effortless, after all.
- Theoremizing is often easier than economizing.
  - Just need first example! Think in numerics first when possible.